Abstract -
I. INTRODUCTION
T here are two potentially important economic rationales for alcohol taxes. First, they help to mitigate various external costs of alcohol abuse, such as the risks to others posed by drunk drivers and the burden of medical costs on third parties from alcohol-related illness. Second, by raising revenue, they reduce the need to rely on other taxes, particularly those that fall on labor income, to fi nance the government's budget. The Ramsey theory of optimal excise taxation implies that such a tax substitution is likely to be desirable if alcohol is a relative complement for leisure, in which case it provides what we shall describe as an additional "fi scal" rationale for alcohol taxation. A truly "optimal" alcohol tax would refl ect both of these considerations.
As regards the fi rst rationale, a number of studies have measured the Pigouvian, or externality-correcting, level of alcohol taxes. Although the usual caveats about parameter uncertainty apply, a typical estimate is a tax of around $70 per gallon, or about three times current federal and state taxes of $24 per gallon; see Parry, West, and Laxminarayan (2009) for a recent discussion of this evidence.
The second rationale for alcohol taxes has not received any attention in the prior literature, at least in a quantitative sense, so there is no basis for gauging to what extent the optimal alcohol tax may differ from the Pigouvian tax. In particular, there have been no attempts to estimate the alcohol-leisure cross-price elasticity, even though it is a critical parameter in determining the Ramsey component of the optimal alcohol tax. It behooves economists to try to estimate this elasticity, and thus provide some insight on whether there is a valid fi scal rationale for alcohol taxes.
This paper provides a fi rst attempt at estimating this elasticity, based on an Almost Ideal Demand System defined over alcohol, leisure, and other goods, estimated with data from the Consumer Expenditure Survey and other sources. While the data are probably as good as we can fi nd, and we believe we have pushed the methodology as far as possible with standard econometric techniques, the confidence intervals we obtain on the alcohol-leisure cross-price elasticity are nonetheless large. However, over a wide range of model specifi cations, alcohol is a relative complement for leisure over a 95 percent confi dence interval, and the resulting Ramsey tax is potentially large. In fact, it is quite plausible that the fi scal component of the optimal alcohol tax is more important than the Pigouvian component. Thus, the adjustments for alcoholleisure complementarity serve to reinforce the effi ciency case for higher alcohol taxes, perhaps by a substantial amount.
Given a number of data and other limitations discussed below, our fi ndings should be viewed as suggestive rather than conclusive. Nonetheless, our analysis has value in demonstrating the potential empirical importance of the Ramsey tax, and in developing an econometric methodology that can be refi ned as the quantity and quality of data improve over time.
Before outlining our empirical approach and results, we first describe in more detail how our paper relates to the previous literature on optimal commodity taxes, external costs, and the workplace productivity effects of alcohol abuse. We conclude with a discussion of some caveats to the case for higher taxes, such as equity issues, the risk that alcohol tax revenues will not be used judiciously, and political opposition to alcohol tax reform.
II. BACKGROUND A. Relation to the Optimal Tax Literature
According to Ramsey tax theory, the optimal tax on a commodity may exceed any level warranted on externality grounds if the product is a relatively weak substitute or a strong complement for leisure, compared with other consumption goods (Sandmo, 1975; Bovenberg and Goulder, 2002) . Under these conditions, up to a point a revenue-neutral shift from a tax on labor income to the commodity tax will (slightly) increase labor supply, inducing an effi ciency gain in the taxdistorted labor market, in addition to any effi ciency gain obtained from mitigating the externality. Converse results apply if the product is a relatively strong substitute for leisure.
This fi scal component of the optimal commodity tax implicitly combines two linkages with the broader tax system that have been decomposed in the literature on environmental tax shifts (Goulder, 1995; Parry and Oates, 2000) . First is the "revenue-recycling effect" or effi ciency gain from using additional commodity tax revenues to reduce distortionary labor taxes. Second is the "tax-interaction effect" or potential effi ciency loss in the labor market from the impact of higher commodity prices on reducing the real returns to work effort, thereby discouraging labor supply. For commodities that are relative leisure complements, the revenue-recycling effect can dominate the tax-interaction effect (and the latter may even reverse sign), implying a net welfare gain from interactions with the tax system, and a positive fi scal component to the optimal commodity tax.
Perhaps surprisingly, there have been few attempts to apply empirically the optimal commodity tax framework to actual taxes. This may be because economists were initially concerned with optimizing over all commodity taxes simultaneously, which is an especially formidable challenge.
1 Instead our focus is on only one commodity tax, assuming the rest of the tax system, primarily income and payroll taxes, is collapsed into a single tax on labor income (interactions with tobacco taxes are discussed in Section V).
Even for the limited number of commodities traditionally targeted with excise taxes-primarily tobacco products, transportation fuels, alcoholic beverages, and telecommunications-there has been little attempt to estimate econometrically the leisure cross-price elasticities that are required to assess how much taxation of these commodities might be warranted on optimal taxation grounds.
2 Diewert and Lawrence (1996) estimate these cross-price elasticities for motor vehicles, housing, and other goods, but not alcohol. Their point estimates indicate that both motor vehicles and housing are relative leisure complements, with compensated cross-price elasticities of -0.14 and -0.79 respectively, compared to a cross-price elasticity of 0.38 for general consumption with respect to the price of leisure. Madden (1995) includes both leisure and alcohol in a demand system estimated with aggregate time series data for Ireland, though the cross-price elasticities are not reported. West and Williams (2007) estimate an Almost Ideal Demand System defined over gasoline, leisure, and other goods using household data. They fi nd that the optimal gasoline tax is around 50 percent larger than the externality-mitigating tax, because gasoline is a relative leisure complement. This makes sense intuitively, as gasoline use increases less than proportionately to labor supply (following a compensated wage increase), given the substantial share of non-work-related trips in total household travel. Another explanation is that driving is a relatively time-intensive activity at the margin, once households have incurred the fi xed cost of buying a car. Becker's (1965) model of time use suggests that time-intensive goods are complements to non-market time.
We have less intuition about other crossprice elasticities, including that between alcohol and leisure. However we might expect that alcohol and leisure would be relative complements, since a substantial share of alcohol use is not work-related, and prior evidence (discussed below) suggests that spending on alcohol increases proportionately less than spending on other goods when households have more (labor) income.
B. Relation to the Health Economics Literature
In health economics, discussions of optimal alcohol taxes usually focus on the externality-correcting or Pigouvian tax, leaving aside linkages between this tax and the broader fi scal system. The most important component of the Pigouvian tax is the (marginal) external cost imposed by drunk drivers. This has been calculated from the (fatal and non-fatal) injury risk that drunk drivers pose to others, treating risks to occupants in vehicles driven by the drunk driver as internal. A portion of various other accident costs, such as property damage and medical 1 This would require reliable estimates of own-and leisure-cross price elasticities for every taxed commodity and functional form assumptions that might be unreliable for large price changes. One response to these problems has been to limit the focus to broad commodity groups, and to the appropriate direction of partial tax reforms (Ahmad and Stern 1984; Madden, 1995; Zodrow, 2006) . 2 A number of studies include alcohol when estimating commodity demand systems but do not include leisure, including Andrikopoulos, Brox, and Carvahlo (1997) , Blake and Nied (1997) , Browning (1991), Blundell, Pashardes, and Weber (1993) , Deaton and Muellbauer (1980) , Eakins and Gallagher (2003) , Fuss and Waverman (1987) , Gao, Wailes, and Cramer (1995) , Holm (1995) , Jones (1989) , Nelson and Moran (1995) , Taube, Huth, and MacDonald (1990) , and Taube and MacDonald (1991) .
burdens, are also external to the extent they are borne by insurance companies or the government. Another component of external costs is the medical burden on third parties from alcohol-induced illness over the lifecycle (net of any medical savings from premature mortality), though these costs appear to be minor relative to the drunk driver externality. In computing the Pigouvian tax, road accident and illness costs are scaled by the sensitivity of drunk driving and heavy drinking, respectively, to alcohol prices, relative to the price sensitivity of overall alcohol consumption. Studies typically put the optimal Pigouvian tax at around 30 percent or more of the pre-tax alcohol price (Manning et al., 1989 (Manning et al., , 1991 Phelps, 1988; Pogue and Sgontz, 1989; Parry, West, and Laxminarayan, 2009 ).
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There is also a large empirical literature on the own-price elasticity for alcohol consumption, though there are some serious measurement challenges in estimating this elasticity (Cook and Moore, 2000) . Most estimates of the own-price elasticity for all alcoholic beverages combined lie between about -0.4 and -1.0 (elasticities for individual beverages sometimes lie outside this range). 4 The own-price elasticity enters into the Ramsey component of the optimal alcohol tax (see below): the more inelastic the demand, the greater the Ramsey tax (assuming alcohol is a relative leisure complement), as there is less erosion of the alcohol tax base in response to higher tax rates.
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Economists have also estimated the productivity and labor supply effects of alcohol consumption, attributing any negative association to the inability of heavy drinkers to concentrate on the job or find and retain stable employment (Cook and Moore, 2000) . As discussed below, such a negative alcohol-healthproductivity relation plays a separate and reinforcing role in raising the optimal alcohol tax above the Pigouvian tax. Some studies fi nd a negative association Sindelar, 1991, 1993) , but others fi nd a "drinker's bonus," that is, a positive association between earnings and alcohol consumption (Berger and Leigh, 1988; Zarkin et al., 1998) though these results may be biased, as earnings are a determinant of alcohol consumption.
Two recent studies address the possibility of endogeneity by estimating reduced form models relating labor market outcomes to alcohol taxes. While Dave and Kaestner (2002) find no evidence that alcohol taxes affect wages, employment, or hours, they express concern that specification error may obscure the true relationships. Cook and Peters (2005) attempt to avoid this problem by using longitudinal data, which enables them to control for a large set of individual-specifi c characteristics. Their results show a positive relationship between alcohol taxes and earnings and support the notion that the drinker's bonus found by others is due to reverse causality, given that alcohol is a normal good.
Because our study focuses on the sensitivity of alcohol consumption with respect to the price of leisure (and not the reverse), we avoid the kind of endogeneity problem discussed above, but face another if alcohol consumption affects wages. We use instrumental variable techniques to address this problem, as discussed below.
III. ECONOMETRIC METHODOLOGY

A. Model Specifi cation
We specify the following Almost Ideal Demand System (AIDS) for an individual household h, defi ned over three "goods", alcohol (A), leisure (l), and a composite of all other consumption goods (C):
leisure, other goods In (1d), we allow a vector of household specifi c characteristics (age, race, education, etc.) , indexed by r h , to affect demand, where ζ j0 and ζ jr are parameters to be estimated and e j h is an error term refl ecting unobserved differences in preferences. We also include state fi xed effects and regional dummies (Northeast, Midwest, South and West) in r h to account for unobserved local factors that might affect alcohol use or work behavior (e.g., liquor laws, cultural factors, climate, and job opportunities).
As discussed below, the Ramsey tax or fi scal component of the optimal alcohol tax depends on the compensated elasticity of alcohol demand with respect to the price of leisure, which is the main focus of our estimation.
B. Data Sources
Household Data
Our main data set consists of 9,454 household observations from twelve consecutive quarters of the Consumer Expenditure Surveys (CEX), 1996-1998. Each quarter, 20 percent of the sample is rotated out and replaced by new households; we pool household observations across different quarters. 8 The CEX fi les include, for each household, spending on alcohol, total spending on all goods, number of children, and state of residence.
9 Another expenditure fi le in the CEX contains two categories of spending on alcohol: (1) 6 The AIDS provides a fi rst-order approximation to any demand system and satisfi es the axioms of consumer choice (Deaton and Muellbauer 1980) . Unlike certain other demand systems, it does not impose (1) weak separability between leisure and consumption goods, or (2) homothetic preferences (which imply unitary expenditure elasticities for all goods); either of these restrictions could seriously bias estimates of the alcoholleisure cross-price elasticity. 7 We limit the number of goods to three for tractability. The omission of another specifi c good would bias the estimate of our quantity of interest, the alcohol-leisure cross-price elasticity, if the effect of the wage on alcohol consumption is correlated with the effect of the price of the other specifi c good on alcohol consumption. 8 Pooling observations enables us to exploit variation over time within household. As mentioned below, we cluster by household to correct for any bias due to dependence across these observations. 9 Self-reported alcohol consumption usually understates actual consumption, perhaps by as much as 50 percent (Cook and Moore, 2000) . If underreporting varies with the wage, then our estimates of the cross-price elasticity of demand will be biased. For example, more prevalent underreporting among high-wage workers will bias the cross-price estimate downward. However, there is very little evidence on whether the errors across survey respondents are additive, proportional, random or systematic, so it is unclear whether, and in what way, underreporting affects our results.
beer and wine, and (2) all other alcohol (i.e., spirits). We attempted to estimate separate elasticities for each category but results were implausible or imprecise, as many households only consume one of the two categories. 10 In addition, for each household, the fi les include usual weekly work hours, occupation, the gross amount of last pay, the duration of the last pay period, age, race, sex, and education level (which we code as above, equal, or below high school diploma).
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We calculate (weekly) spending on the composite good as total expenditure less that on alcohol, leisure as a (non-sleep) time endowment of 90 hours per week less work hours (our results are not sensitive with respect to the value of the time endowment), and full income as total expenditure plus the product of leisure and the net wage. Wages are measured by gross wages from the CEX, corrected for sel ection bias (see below), and net of federal and state income taxes and earned income and child tax credits; effective tax rates for different wage rates were obtained from NBER's TAXSIM model (Feenberg and Coutts, 1993) . As payroll taxes are partially offset by higher future social security benefi ts, we do not deduct them in our baseline specification, though we do deduct them in one of the sensitivity analysis specifi cations.
Price Data
For the alcohol price we use the American Chamber of Commerce Research Association (ACCRA) cost-of-living index, which lists quarterly average prices for beer, wine, and spirits for approximately 300 urban areas. We weight city and town prices by population shares (from the 2000 census) to obtain statelevel alcohol prices. To obtain one price of alcohol, we convert beer, wine, and spirits prices into prices per liter, and weight them by the average share of each beverage in total liters of alcohol consumption. The ACCRA data are also used to obtain a price index for the composite good.
Although often used in the empirical alcohol demand literature, the ACCRA price index can be problematic. One issue is that the data are collected by members of local chambers of commerce and there may be some inconsistency in measurement across states. However, measurement errors in alcohol prices are only a concern for the alcohol-leisure cross-price elasticity if they are spatially correlated with wages or leisure, which seems unlikely.
Another problem is that spatial differences in alcohol prices may be collinear with the state fi xed-effect variables. In our data, state fixed effects absorb a signifi cant portion but by no means all of the variation in state alcohol prices, as these prices vary across time. The average standard deviations of within-state wine, beer, and alcohol prices are 11 percent, 9 percent, and 7 percent of the within-state price averages, respectively. There is on average a difference of about $2, $4, and $8, respectively between minimum and maximum prices within states. After these prices are weighted and averaged to obtain one price per liter of alcohol, the average within-state standard deviation in 10 Assessing whether there is any basis for differential taxation of individual beverages on externality grounds is very diffi cult because, for example, data on alcohol involvement in traffi c accidents is not distinguished by beverage class. As for the fi scal rationale, there appears to be some basis for taxing beer more heavily than wine, and wine more heavily than spirits (Parry, West, and Laxminarayan, 2009) . This is because the estimated own-price elasticities for beer are smaller in magnitude than for wine, which in turn are smaller than for spirits. In contrast, spirits are taxed most heavily, at about $35 per gallon of alcohol, compared with $20 per gallon for beer, and $18 for wine (Parry, West, and Laxminarayan, 2009 , Table 1 ). 11 Other data sets commonly used in empirical work on alcohol demand do not contain all the variables we require; for example, the National Health Interview Survey excludes wages, while the Behavioral Risk Factor Surveillance System excludes both wages and hours worked.
this price is 8 percent of the average price. Lack of variation in within-state alcohol prices magnifi es the standard error on the own-price alcohol elasticity, though again this is not a primary concern for the alcohol-leisure cross-price elasticity. Nonetheless, we also estimate specifications (1) with no fi xed effects, and (2) with various fixed effects alternatives commonly used in the literature, including proportion of state population in college, state average temperature, average cloudy days per year, number of drinking establishments and places of worship per capita, and a dummy variable for whether alcohol sales are permitted on Sundays (to proxy for anti-drinking sentiment). In these alternative specifi cations the confidence interval for the own-price alcohol elasticity is somewhat narrower, though that for the alcohol-leisure cross-price elasticity is only moderately affected. In the benchmark estimation we control for state fi xed effects to reduce the possibility of omitted variables bias.
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C. Correcting for Selection Bias and Endogeneity
Not all household members participate in the labor force and about half of the households in our sample report no alcohol consumption. Following Heckman (1979) , we attempt to correct for possible selection bias by estimating probits on the discrete choice of whether to work and whether to consume alcohol. We then exclude from the second-stage estimation households that do not work and that do not consume alcohol, to avoid estimation bias when there are a large number of censored households (Shonkwiler and Yen, 1999) . More details on these fi rst-stage estimation procedures are provided in Appendix A.
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In the case of labor force participation, we estimate a probit model jointly with a wage equation using the full information maximum likelihood approach to generate the selectivity-corrected wage for each household for use in estimating the demand system in (1a). In the fi rststage estimation we use standard exclusion restrictions from the literature (e.g., number of children, partner's earnings, and the unemployment rate).
For the decision of whether to consume alcohol, we estimate a probit to obtain the predicted inverse Mills ratios, denoted MR a h , and include them in the demand system in (1a) to give:
where γ j are parameters. However, our exclusion restriction for alcohol consumption, whether the individual is over the age of 21, is probably a weak source of identification as it involves relatively few households, and as being underage affects alcohol consumption on both the extensive and intensive margins. 14 In the sensitivity analysis we therefore also follow many other studies in the literature 12 Some researchers have used state beer taxes to proxy for alcohol prices, but this is also problematic (Young and Bielinska-Kwapisz, 2002) . In particular, taxes are only a tiny fraction of retail prices, and therefore fail to control for spatial differences in transportation, distribution, and other producer costs. We experimented with state-and quarter-specifi c beer tax rates as instruments for alcohol prices, but this rendered the alcohol own-price elasticity positive. 13 The usual caveat about problems with using the Heckman correction applies here-only data resulting from a natural experiment (with perfect measurement) would yield fully credible solutions to censoring problems. Unfortunately no such data exist. 14 Variables related to religion are probably more likely to affect only the extensive margin, and thus be better exclusion restrictions. Unfortunately, the CEX does not ask households about religious affi liation. It does ask households how much they give to religious organizations, but less than 8 percent of our households responded to the question.
by ignoring the discrete choice of alcohol, reporting results from system estimation on the non-censored sample.
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The net-of-tax wage rate might be endogenous if (1) alcohol abuse affects on-the-job productivity, (2) there are errors in measuring earnings and hours worked that are correlated, and (3) marginal income tax rates vary as earnings vary with hours worked. To obtain consistent estimates we instrument for wages in our benchmark case using the occupation-, state-, and gender-specifi c mean net wage, from the entire CEX. Because observations are thin across some quarter-occupation-state-gender categories, we use time-invariant wage instruments in our baseline specifi cation, Weekly alcohol consumption (liters) One-adult weekly work hours Two-adult male weekly work hours Two-adult female weekly work hours Share of alcohol expenditure in full income One-adult share of leisure in full income Two-adult male share of leisure in full income Two-adult female share of leisure in full income Share of composite good in full income Weighed alcohol price ($/liter) Price of composite good (index) One-adult Heckman-corrected net hourly wage ($) Two-adult male Heckman-corrected net hourly wage ($) Two-adult female Heckman-corrected net hourly wage ($) Weekly full income ($) One-adult age (years) Two-adult male age (years) Two-adult female age (years) One-adult education: < high school diploma (%) One-adult education: high school diploma (%) One-adult education: > high school diploma (%) Two-adult male education: < high school diploma (%) Two-adult male education: high school diploma (%) Two-adult male education: > high school diploma (%) Two-adult female education: < high school diploma (%) Two-adult female education: high school diploma (%) Two-adult female education: > high school diploma (%) Number of children One-Adult Households Two-Adult Households 15 We also estimated a two-part model with no exclusion restriction; but identifi cation of the self-selection model through non-linearity of the inverse Mills ratio alone may also be weak as this ratio is linear over certain ranges of the index (Vella, 1998) . This estimation also yields a positive (but insignifi cant) own-price elasticity for alcohol; again this casts some doubt on the reliability of our estimate of this elasticity, but is not a major concern for the alcohol-leisure cross-price elasticity.
but we also report results from using quarter-specifi c wage instruments. The real income term log(F h /P h ) may also be endogenous, because P h is a function of individual-specific expenditure shares that are also dependent variables. We therefore instrument for this term, using an alternative price index obtained by replacing the individual-specifi c shares in equation (1b) with the sample mean shares. Because the instrument is still a function of the same ratio of household price to mean price in equation (1b), it is strongly correlated with the instrumented variable, but is no longer a function of the dependent variables.
D. Summary Statistics
Table 1 presents summary statistics for data used in our benchmark estimation, that is, for working households with positive alcohol purchases. One-and twoadult households each consume about two liters of alcohol per week, or about 1-2 percent of household full income, while both household types spend about half of their full income on leisure. The average selectivity-corrected net wage is $8.09 per hour in the one-adult sample, and $10.98 per hour for men and $8.56 per hour for women in the two-adult sample.
E. Estimation Procedure
We use three-stage least squares (3SLS) to estimate separate demand systems for one-and two-adult households, which enables us to use instrumental variables and generalized least squares to account for any error correlation across equations.
16 Each adult's leisure is treated as a separate good; thus, the two-adult demand system includes male leisure, female leisure, alcohol, and composite consumption. We impose the restrictions in (1a-d) and drop the equation for other goods, as the restrictions constrain the parameters from that equation to be linear combinations of the estimated parameters in the gasoline and leisure equations. Household characteristics include members' age, age-squared, race, sex (in oneadult estimation only), number of children and education level. 17 We use parameters from the demand system to generate aggregate alcohol demand elasticities for one-and two-adult households, and alcohol-leisure crossprice elasticities for one-adult households and for men and women in two-adult households.
18 To obtain a single, ownprice alcohol elasticity, we take a weighted average over those for one-and two-adult households where the weights are their alcohol consumption. And to obtain a single alcohol-leisure cross-price elasticity, we fi rst average the male and female elasticities for two-adult households and then take an alcohol-weighted average over elasticities for one-and two-adult households. Aggregate labor supply elasticities are calculated in a similar way, weighting by hours worked.
Confi dence intervals for elasticities were obtained from a non-parametric bias-cor- 16 We experimented with estimating the system using generalized method of moments (GMM). Since such estimation did not appreciably change estimates nor improve precision and is more tedious to implement, we elected to use 3SLS (but also report results obtained using 2SLS). 17 We could estimate the full econometric model, including all discrete and continuous choices, with maximum likelihood estimation. However, since censoring occurs in both alcohol and leisure demand, and for either or both the male and female in two-adult households, we would need to evaluate multiple integrals in the likelihood function, which would be computationally intensive given that we bootstrap standard errors. 18 We calculate elasticities using methods and equations explained in West and Williams (2007) . Parameters from the system estimation are used to fi nd the effects of prices on consumption shares, which are then transformed into derivatives involving quantities, calculated for each household and correcting for any corner solutions. Finally, these household-specifi c derivatives are transformed and aggregated into sample-wide elasticities. 19 We also attempted to cluster by state rather than by household, but this worsens the fi t on the compensated labor supply elasticity and therefore on the difference between it and the cross-price elasticity. The bias-corrected bootstrap method is appropriate in cases where the variances vary as a function of the parameters of interest. Notes: These 3SLS regressions use ln(mean net wage by occupation, by state and gender) instruments for ln(net wage) and ln(F/P) calculated using the price index based on mean expenditure shares as instruments for the ln(F/P), using individual-specifi c shares. All regressions include state and region dummy variables. Bootstrapped standard errors are in parentheses. Asterisks indicate statistically signifi cance at the 1% (***), or 10% (*) level.
rected bootstrap that selects 1,500 random sub-samples of the full data set, estimates the corrections for selectivity bias, and then estimates the demand systems using each sub-sample. We cluster observations by household in generating each bootstrap sample, given that observations for the same household for multiple quarters are not independent (this precludes us from clustering by any other variable).
19 Notes: These 3SLS regressions use ln(mean net wage by occupation, by state and gender) instruments for ln(net wage) and ln(F/P) calculated using the price index based on mean expenditure shares as instruments for the ln(F/P) using individual-specifi c shares. All regressions include state and region dummy variables. Bootstrapped standard errors are in parentheses. Asterisks indicate statistically signifi cance at the 1% (***), or 10% (*) level.
IV. RESULTS
A. Econometric Estimates
Regression Results
Tables 2 and 3 report the coeffi cient estimates for the baseline specifi cation of oneand two-adult demand systems, which includes the variables described above. Negative coeffi cients on the ln(F/P) terms indicate that for both one-and two-adult households, alcohol and leisure are necessities. In one-adult households, the share of leisure increases as wage increases. For two-adult households, the share of leisure (for either adult) also increases as his or her wage increases but decreases as the wage of the other adult in the household increases. 20 The effect of the male wage on alcohol consumption is the strongest of the cross-price relationships estimated here; the share of spending devoted to alcohol falls as the male wage increases.
Baseline Elasticities
The fi rst row of Table 4 reports elasticity estimates and 95 percent confi dence intervals for our two-step baseline specification with state fi xed effects. Confi dence intervals for the uncompensated and compensated labor supply elasticities are 0.02-0.28 and 0.19-0.39 respectively, which are consistent with prior estimates in the empirical micro literature (Blundell and MaCurdy, 1999; Fuchs, Krueger, and Poterba, 1998). 21 Alcohol is a relative complement for leisure when the (compensated) alcoholleisure cross-price elasticity is less than the compensated labor supply elasticity (see below); it is an absolute complement for leisure when the cross-price elasticity is negative. In our baseline specifi cation, the estimated cross-price elasticity is -0.09; however, it has a wide confi dence interval of -0.42 to 0.22, underscoring the need for sensitivity analysis in inferring optimal taxes, rather than placing too much emphasis on the baseline point estimate. The last column of Table 4 indicates that alcohol is at least a relative (if not absolute) leisure complement over a 95 percent confi dence interval.
Our baseline estimate of the own-price alcohol elasticity is -1.19, which is on the high side relative to earlier literature, though the confi dence interval for this elasticity is very wide, refl ecting limited spatial variation in alcohol prices. Again, however, our primary focus is not on this elasticity, given that there is reasonable consensus among health economists over a plausible range for its magnitude. We also estimate the aggregate expenditure elasticity of demand for alcohol at 0.06 (not shown in the table), which is broadly consistent with previous studies. 22 20 When translated into cross-price elasticities using the techniques described in footnote 17 above, these effects become more intuitive. As shown below, we fi nd positive wage elasticities of labor supply; an increase in the wage causes the share of leisure to increase not because households increase leisure hours, but because the decrease in leisure hours is proportionally smaller than the wage increase. Similarly, our parameter estimates translate into negative cross-price labor supply elasticities; as men's wage increases, women's work hours decrease, and as women's wage increases, men's work hours decrease. 21 They are also broadly consistent with labor supply assumptions in tax simulation models (Browning, 1987; Ballard, Shoven, and Whalley, 1985; Ballard, 1990; Goulder and Williams, 2003) . Even though the uncompensated hours worked elasticity for males is typically estimated to be close to zero or slightly negative, estimates of the economy-wide elasticity, averaged over hours worked and participation responses for male and female workers, are generally positive; this mainly refl ects the sizable participation elasticity for secondary workers. Macroeconomic studies that attempt to explain aggregate labor supply variation across business cycles, or across different countries, fi nd much larger elasticities than the micro studies in the empirical labor literature, though the reasons for this discrepancy remain a puzzle (Prescott, 2004) . 22 Recent estimates of expenditure elasticities (averaging over all beverages) include 0.10 in Baltagi and Griffi n (1995) , below 0.10 in Farrell, Manning, and Finch (2003) , 0.11 in Lee and Tremblay (1992) , 0.25 in Manning, Blumberg, and Moulton (1995) , 0.40 in Nelson and Moran (1995) , 0.18 in Ruhm (1995) , 0.89 in Selvanathan (1991) , and 0.4 in Yen (1994) . 
Sensitivity Analysis
The rest of Table 4 presents results under various alternative specifi cations, including estimation that includes payroll tax rates, estimation using two stage least squares (2SLS), one-step estimation (with no inverse Mills ratio for the discrete choice over whether to consume alcohol), no state fixed effects, two alternatives for state fi xed effects, no instrument for wages, quarter-specific wage instruments, and alternative values for the household time endowment. Results are moderately sensitive to these specifi cations; for example, the point estimates for the alcohol-leisure cross price elasticities vary between -0.12 and 0.08, though they are all well below the corresponding point estimates for the compensated labor supply elasticities. However in specifi cations without fi xed effects or with quarter-specifi c wage instruments, alcohol is no longer a relative leisure complement across the entire 95 percent confi dence interval. We incorporate this uncertainty into our tax simulations below. Results without state fi xed effects demonstrate the fact that state fi xed effects soak up a good degree of alcohol price variation; own-price elasticities of alcohol demand in these specifi cations are statistically different than zero.
We believe the specifi cations without fixed effects and with time-varying wage instruments produce less reliable estimates of the alcohol-leisure elasticity than our baseline case. This is due to the possibility of omitted variable bias in the case of omitted state fi xed effects, and because the observations needed to construct time-varying wage instruments are rather thin across some quarter-stateoccupation-gender categories.
B. Optimal Tax Computations
Formula and Parameter Values
Parry, West, and Laxminarayan (2009) integrate a static, utility-based model of externalities from drunk driving and from medical burdens on third-parties from alcohol-induced illness into a general equilibrium model that captures interactions between alcohol taxes and tax distortions in the labor market. Based on some straightforward manipulation of the results in that paper, an approximation for the optimal (revenue-neutral) alcohol tax is:
where t A is a specifi c tax expressed per gallon of pure alcohol, p A is the pre-tax per gallon price of alcohol, t L is a proportional tax on labor income, η AA < 0 is the ownprice elasticity for alcohol, ε LL is a labor supply elasticity defi ned with respect to the net of tax wage or price of leisure, η Al is the elasticity of alcohol consumption with respect to the price of leisure, and c denotes a compensated (as opposed to uncompensated) elasticity. The variable MEG denotes the marginal effi ciency gain from recycling a dollar of revenue from labor tax reductions; it is greater the larger are (1) the (uncompensated) labor supply elasticity, and (2) the labor tax wedge. Finally, ρ is the reduction in workplace productivity per unit of alcohol consumption, caused by health effects or injuries sustained in drunk-driver accidents. The formula in (3) separates the optimal alcohol tax into three components. The fi rst is the Pigouvian tax which, as discussed above, encompasses the various external costs of road accidents and alcohol-induced illness, scaled by the relative responsiveness of drunk driving and heavy drinking to alcohol prices. Following the recent review and synthesis of evidence in Parry, West, and Laxminarayan (2009) , that is, when the compensated alcohol-leisure cross-price elasticity is smaller than the compensated labor supply elasticity, which occurs with 95 percent confi dence in our baseline econometric estimates. However, given the uncertainty over elasticities in our own estimates, and in the earlier empirical literature, we illustrate a wide range of possibilities. For the own-price elasticity for alcohol, we consider low, medium and high values of -0.4, -0.8 and -1.2 respectively, and for the labor supply elasticities, we consider low values of ε LL = 0.10, ε The last component in (3) is the revenue loss from reduced workplace productivity, which is a cost to the government and therefore external to individuals (as opposed to the reduction in net of tax wages which is internal to individuals). The effect is multiplied by 1 + MEG to account for the effi ciency effect of raising the labor tax to make up for the lost revenue. Following Parry, West, and Laxminarayan (2009), we adopt low, medium and high values of ρ = $12, $93, and $174 per alcohol gallon respectively, which roughly spans the wide range of estimates of health/productivity impacts in the (unsettled) empirical literature. Multiplying by (1 + MEG)t L , the productivity effect adds between $5-87 per alcohol gallon to the optimal tax. Figure 1 shows the fi scal component of the optimal alcohol tax relative to the Pigouvian tax under a wide variety of parameter scenarios. The three panels correspond to our three sets of assumptions about labor supply elasticities; the curves in each panel correspond to our three different values for the own-price elasticity of alcohol, and along the horizontal axis in each panel we vary the alcohol-leisure cross-price elasticity across its assumed range of values.
Results
The relative size of the fi scal component is highly parameter sensitive, varying from slightly negative (in the extreme right of panel (a)) to more than five times the Pigouvian tax. Clearly, more empirical estimates of the alcohol-leisure cross-price elasticity are needed to pin 23 Ramsey (1927) and Corlett and Hague (1953-54) are the classic contributions to the literature. For a recent discussion, see Ballard, Shoven, and Whalley (1985) . 24 Our values for MEG are approximately consistent with estimates of the marginal excess burden of taxation for fi nancing public goods (Ballard, Shoven, and Whalley, 1985; Ballard, 1990; Wildasin 1984) , aside from some caveats noted in Section V below. 25 The formula in (3) is an approximation as it excludes from the fi scal component changes in the government budget due to changes in spending on medical care and implementation of drunk driver penalties. In Parry, West, and Laxminarayan (2009) down a narrower, plausible range for this parameter, and hence the optimal alcohol tax. Nonetheless, Figure 1 illustrates the potential importance of this issue. For most parameter combinations the curves lie above unity, implying that the fi scal component of the optimal tax exceeds the Pigouvian component. Finally, Table 5 illustrates the absolute values of the three components of the optimal alcohol tax under alternative scenarios. Under medium values for all parameters, the optimal alcohol tax is $246 per alcohol gallon, an order of magnitude larger than the current tax; the Pigouvian, fi scal and productivity components account for 28 percent, 56 percent and 16 percent, respectively, of this optimal tax. There are a couple of cases in which the fiscal component is relatively modest, or even negative, namely when both the labor supply elasticities take their medium or low values and the own-price alcohol and alcohol-leisure cross-price elasticities are large. But in the seven other parameter combinations illustrated in Table 5 , the fi scal component is anything from around $70 per gallon, to over $400 per gallon.
V. CONCLUSION
Although implementation of a fully optimized set of taxes on all commodities is impractical, existing commodity taxes, primarily on alcohol, cigarettes and transportation fuels, are frequently justifi ed on revenue-raising grounds. It therefore behooves economists to assess what levels of these taxes might be appropriate on fiscal grounds, even though estimates are always likely to be imprecise given the diffi culty of accurately estimating the own-and cross-price elasticities required to compute optimal tax rates.
This paper provides a fi rst attempt to econometrically estimate the alcoholleisure cross-price elasticity. We fi nd that alcohol is a relative complement for leisure over 95 percent confi dence intervals in many (though not all) specifi cations. Substituting from a range of values for the alcohol-leisure cross-price elasticity into an optimal tax formula, we fi nd that the Ramsey tax component is potentially very large and quite plausibly exceeds the Pigiouvian tax. Given that Pigouvian tax estimates are well above current alcohol tax levels, fi scal considerations appear to substantially reinforce the case for raising alcohol taxes.
We are, however, at pains to emphasize the preliminary nature of these fi ndings. The confi dence intervals on the alcoholleisure cross-price elasticity are large, so we cannot, given current data availability and quality, pin down the Ramsey tax with accuracy. We hope that the methodology we have laid out, along with the importance of the issue for alcohol policy, will stimulate future empirical investigations and narrow the range of uncertainty over the size of the Ramsey tax.
We conclude with some broader caveats related to the effi ciency case for higher alcohol taxes. One is household equity. Alcohol taxes are regressive, even when household income is measured on a lifetime (rather than annual) basis (Lyon and Schwab, 1995) . 26 A possible response to this is to disaggregate different income groups in optimal tax analyses and incorporate distributional weights (e.g., Cremer, Gahvari, and Ladoux, 1998) . This would lower the optimal alcohol tax, though by how much is unclear as society's aversion to income inequality is diffi cult to measure empirically. These adjustments also run counter to the view that distributional concerns are most effi ciently addressed through the broader tax and benefi t system. As a compromise, higher alcohol taxes might be accompanied by a recycling of revenues that is skewed towards to the poor, or by adjustments under the income tax that would on average offset their distributional effects.
Another concern is that additional revenues from alcohol taxes may end up being wasted in special interest spending, rather than being used to substitute for other taxes. This is a legitimate concern, given how Congress appears to have used new revenue sources in the past (Becker and Mulligan, 2003) . In principle this problem can be avoided if legislation accompanying an alcohol tax increase specifies an automatic and offsetting reduction in other taxes, thereby eliminating the possibility of new funding for special interests.
Clearly, there is strong political opposition to higher alcohol taxes, not least from the brewing and hospitality industries. In principle, some temporary tax relief might be provided to beverage suppliers, though at the expense of lowering the potential effi ciency gains from more socially productive revenue use. Moreover, public health groups would likely oppose any such compensation.
A related point is that alcohol taxes are mostly levied on a per unit basis, requiring frequent increases in the nominal rate to prevent erosion of their revenue-raising capacity by infl ation. Such adjustments are politically diffi cult, as suggested by the decline in real alcohol tax rates since 1970 (Kenkel, 1996) . Besides raising the overall level of taxation, there is also a case for converting taxes to an ad valorem basis, to prevent progressive erosion in the real tax rate over time.
Our analysis focuses on alcohol in isolation, though in practice the demand for cigarettes is likely affected by alcohol prices. The implications for the optimal alcohol tax are unclear, however, as empirical work on whether alcohol and cigarettes are complements or substitutes is unsettled (Decker and Schwartz, 2000) , as is the literature on whether cigarettes are currently under-or over-taxed (Gruber, 2002 (Gruber, -2003 Viscusi, 2002 Viscusi, -2003 .
Finally we note that, by ignoring some broader distortions created by the tax system, our discussion may signifi cantly understate the optimal alcohol tax. Income taxes distort the choice between ordinary spending and tax-preferred spending, such as employer-provided medical insurance and owner-occupied housing. Accounting for these distortions raises the effi ciency gains from recycling excise tax revenues in income tax reductions, implying a higher optimal commodity tax (Parry and Bento, 2000) . Similarly, the effi ciency gains from revenue recycling and the optimal level of commodity taxation can also be greater when allowance is made for the distortionary effect of income taxes in depressing capital accumulation below economically effi cient levels (Bovenberg and Goulder, 1997 ).
For our benchmark estimation, inverse Mills ratios (MR a h ) were obtained from estimating probit models for one-and two-adult households on the choice of whether to consume alcohol. Each probit includes age, age squared, race, marital status, number of children, region, and the logs of the alcohol price, composite good price and spending on the composite good. As mentioned in the text, while variables associated with religion are good candidates for exclusion restrictions, our data do not contain information on religious affi liation, and information on religious contributions is very incomplete. Given the absence of a better determinant of the discrete choice of alcohol that does not affect the continuous choice of alcohol, we use under 21 years of age as our exclusion restriction.
The Labor Force Participation Decision
For the fi rst-stage choice of whether to work, we jointly estimate a probit and net wage equation using full information maximum likelihood, separately for one-and two-adult households, and within those samples, separately for men and for women. The one-adult probits include age, age squared, education, race, marital status, number of children, region, the log of alcohol price, the log of the other good price, and state-specifi c quarterly unemployment rates; the two-adult probits also contain partner's earnings and demographic information.
Because we use a linear approximation to the price index, wages affect the price derivatives of demand even for non-workers (though this effect is minimal), and thus we need to predict wages for nonworkers as well as for workers. And because occupation is an important determinant of the net wage but is observed only for workers, we run two selection models for each subsample, one to estimate workers' net wages and the other to estimate nonworkers' net wages. Within each subsample (where one such subsample, for example, is composed of women from one-adult households) both selection models use the same set of observations of workers and nonworkers and identical probits. To estimate net wages for nonworkers we specify a wage equation that includes education, age, age squared, race, marital status, region, and the inverse Mills ratio from the probits, while to estimate net wages for workers, we include those same variables plus occupation indicators. Since net wages are distributed log normal, we defi ne the dependent variable as the log of net wage. We calculate predicted net wages for workers to include in the demand system estimation.
In principle, the Heckman selection model is identifi ed even when the variables in the probit and the wage regression are the same. In that case, the model is identifi ed by its functional form and the normality assumption. Note, however, that the probits include number of children, the log of alcohol price, the log of the other good price, state-specifi c quarterly unemployment rates, and, in the case of two-adult households, partner's earnings; the wage equations do not. The number of children affects the fi xed cost of working and thus the participation decision. But we do not expect the number of children to affect the wage, since we control for age, race, and gender; the number of children is a standard exclusion restriction in the labor supply literature.
Our demand system allows alcohol and other good prices to affect the continuous demand for leisure and thus it is reasonable to assume that they also affect the discrete work choice. While high price regions may also be high wage regions, there is no reason to postulate that an individual facing a high alcohol price or other good price will have a higher wage, since we control for region in our wage equation. Unemployment rates proxy for job availability in a state and thus affect the likelihood of working, but it is not clear why they would affect wages. Partner's earnings proxy for an individual's nonwage income, but should not directly affect an individual's wage; this is another standard exclusion restriction.
